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3. John Howard, weapons 
of mass destruction and the 
public’s right to know 
In March 2003, Australia went to war in Iraq to find and remove 
Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  None 
were found. An Australian Parliamentary Committee concluded: 
The case made by the government was that Iraq possessed WMD in large 
quantities and posed a grave and unacceptable threat to the region and the 
world, particularly as there was a danger that Iraq’s WMD might be passed to 
terrorist organisations. This is not the picture that emerges from an examina-
tion of the assessments provided to the Committee by the Australian Office of 
National Assessments (ONA) and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO).   
This commentary examines what was the threat to Australia, what the 
government said it was, and what the Australian intelligence agencies said 
it was.  It also describes the media reaction and government response to the 
Parliamentary Committee Report and discusses whether the government 
explained its position honestly.
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Introduction
IN MARCH 2003, Australia went to war in Iraq to find and remove Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD).1  None were found.  In 2004, the US Iraq Survey Group found that Saddam had had 
no WMD for at least a decade before the war in 2003, and there was no 
evidence that he wanted to supply WMD to terrorist groups.2
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In Australia, an inquiry by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, 
ASIS and DSD (the Jull Committee)3 considered the nature, accuracy and 
independence of Australian intelligence on Iraq, and the accuracy and 
completeness of the presentation of that intelligence to the Australian people. 
Its report was released on 1 March 2004. The Jull Committee concluded:
The case made by the government was that Iraq possessed WMD in 
large quantities and posed a grave and unacceptable threat to the region 
and the world, particularly as there was a danger that Iraq’s WMD might 
be passed to terrorist organisations.  This is not the picture that emerges 
from an examination of the assessments provided to the Committee 
by the Australian Office of National Assessments4 and the Defence  
Intelligence Organisation. (Jull, 2003, p. 93)    
The Prime Minister, John Howard, claimed in Parliament the most important 
thing the Jull Report did was that it ‘completely denied the 12-month claim 
of Labor (the Opposition Party at the time) that we went to war based on a 
lie’ (Hansard, 1 March 2004, p. 25391).  ‘What we did was justified by the 
intelligence available to us.  I certainly didn’t exaggerate things’ (quoted 
in The Australian, 1 March 2004).  The Foreign Minister said the report 
‘vindicates the government’s use of intelligence in making the case for 
action against Iraq’ (Hansard, 1 March 2004, p. 25391).  
The purpose of this commentary is to examine some of the print media’s 
reaction to the Jull Report, and to the government’s response to the report.  It 
is based on reports in two national newspapers and the main newspapers in 
Canberra, Melbourne, and Sydney—The Age, The Australian, The Australian 
Financial Review, The Canberra Times and The Sydney Morning Herald—in 
the days following the release of the Jull Report.
The commentary is in three parts.  It looks first at four intelligence-related 
issues: the threat of WMD to Australia, assessment of the consequences of 
going to war, political interference in intelligence assessments and the reasons 
for going to war.  The second part looks at the scope and nature of the press 
coverage, particularly of those four issues, and the final part considers the 
accuracy and honesty of the government’s explanations.
 
What was the threat to Australia? 
What did the government say it was, and what did the Australian intelligence 
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agencies say it was?  How serious, likely and urgent was it?
Prime Minister Howard said in Parliament in early 2003 that ‘Iraq’s con-
tinued defiance of the UN and its possession of CBW (chemical and biological 
weapons) and its pursuit of a nuclear capability poses a real and unacceptable 
threat to the stability and security of our world’ (Hansard, 3 March 2003, 
p. 10642).  He also said, ‘possession of chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons by terrorists would constitute a direct, undeniable and lethal threat 
to Australia and its people’ (Hansard, 18 March 2003, p. 12506). Foreign 
Minister Downer added that ‘Saddam Hussein does have proven links to 
terrorism. The combination of his weapons of mass destruction and the 
determination of terrorists to acquire them is for this government an 
unacceptable threat’ (Hansard, 18 March 2003, p. 12532).  
Howard’s sources of information were apparently not Australian but 
overseas intelligence agencies.  He said ‘the British JIC (Joint Intelligence 
Committee) judged that Iraq has a useable CBW capability, which has included 
recent production of CB (chemical and biological) agents....The analysis 
provided by the Director of the US Central Intelligence (Agency) reached 
similar conclusions, namely Iraq...has begun renewed production of CW 
(chemical warfare) agents’ (Hansard, 3 March 2003, p. 10645).  
A year later, the Jull Report noted that the Australian intelligence agencies 
had made little assessment of the immediacy of the threat, but ONA (Office of 
National Assessments) had said in March 2001 that the threat was less than it 
had been in 1991 (Jull, 2003, p. 40).  The report also said that from February 
2000 to September 2002, ONA and DIO (Defence Intelligence Organisation) 
had agreed that ‘while there is a capacity to restart programmes, chemical 
weapons and biological weapons, if they exist at all, would be in small quanti-
ties’ and that Saddam Hussein’s ‘capacity to use his weapons is low, and his 
willingness to use them is…defensive’ (ibid., p. 31).    
DIO doubted there had been any CBW after 1991 (Jull, 2003, p. 98) and 
said it would not have judged that the threat was ‘real and unacceptable’ (ibid., 
p. 95).  After September 2002, ONA ‘tends to be much more definitive ... 
and assertive’ (Jull, 2003, pp. 32-33), saying that it was ‘highly likely’ WMD 
existed, but still describing them as ‘small stocks’ (ibid., p. 98).
So according to the Australian intelligence agencies, although WMD 
probably existed, their significance in terms of capability and intention was 
that the threat was not serious, likely or imminent.
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What was the assessment of the consequences of going to war?
Howard said on 20 March 2003 that ‘we believe that so far from our action in 
Iraq increasing the terrorist threat, it will, by stopping the spread of chemical 
and biological weapons, make it less likely that a devastating terrorist attack 
will be carried out against Australia’.5 ONA did not tell the Jull Committee if 
it had made a judgment on whether the war would lessen the terrorist threat 
to Australia, although the British Joint Intelligence Committee’s view to the 
contrary had been made in February 2003 (Jull, 2003, p. 97). Howard did not 
mention that in his public statements. 
A later Australian report said that there had been no national intelligence 
assessment that looked at the big picture, and ‘little intelligence assessment 
[of] the strategic cost implications for Australia of contributing to military 
action against Iraq, the likely strategic costs and issues involved in post-
Saddam Iraq, and the impact of military action on the safety of Australia and 
Australians’ (Flood, 2004, p. 27). 
So as far as the Jull Committee was concerned, there was no evidence of 
intelligence in support of planning for Australian involvement in a post-war 
Iraq.
Was there political interference in the preparation of assessments?
DIO and ONA told the Jull Committee no, and its report said ‘the committee 
has received no evidence that political pressure was applied to the agencies’. 
However, it found unpersuasive ONA’s explanation for its sudden assertive-
ness in September 2002 (Jull, 2003, p. 54). 
To what extent was intelligence the determinant in going to war?
The Prime Minister had based his arguments on going to war on the 
existence of WMD in Iraq, their magnitude, and particularly the concern that 
they might fall into the hands of terrorists.  In a major speech, he said: ‘And 
if terrorists ever get their hands on weapons of mass destruction that will, 
in my very passionate belief and argument, constitute a direct, undeniable 
and lethal threat to Australia and its people, and that would be the ultimate 
nightmare not only for us but for other peoples in other nations.  That, more 
than anything else, is the reason why we have taken the stance we have and it 
is the reason why we believe that Iraq should be effectively and comprehen-
sively disarmed’6 (Address to the National Press Club, 14 March 2003). 
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But were there other reasons, and if so, how important were they? The 
Jull Committee’s terms of reference did not include any consideration of the 
policy-making process that led to the decision to go to war other than the 
extent to which intelligence on WMD had been a determinant (Jull, 2003, 
p. 82).  However, the committee pointed out that the evidence in support of 
the government’s position was not based solely on intelligence, but also on ‘a 
mixture of historical experience, first principle hypotheses, deductive logic, 
assumption and assertion’ (ibid., p. 89).  It also noted that DIO said it had made 
a judgment that ‘the US was committed to military action against Iraq, [and] 
...that was ...independent of the intelligence assessment’ (ibid., p. 81).  
Some had argued for regime change because Saddam was a monster, and 
that regime change would moderate forces in the Middle East making more 
likely both a solution to the Israel/Palestine problem and the reduction/eradica-
tion of terrorism.  Howard had not adopted that argument.  In fact, he rejected 
it.  ‘I would have to accept that if Iraq had genuinely disarmed, I couldn’t 
justify on its own a military invasion of Iraq to change the regime.  I’ve never 
advocated that’ (Address to the National Press Club, 14 March 2003). 
He had not hidden, however, the importance to him of the security 
alliance with the United States.7  
The scope and nature of the press coverage
On 2 March 2004, the press gave page one attention and considerable space 
to the Jull Report and the government’s responses.  In general, their articles, 
opinion pieces and editorials covered all the main criticisms the report had 
made. Most papers pursued the issues on March 3.  The quotes in the follow-
ing paragraphs come from the editions on 2 and 3 March 2004.  It is beyond 
the scope of this commentary to analyse the emphases and differences in 
interpretation that appeared among and even within the different newspa-
pers, and that is certainly a topic worth pursuing.  However, the following 
description does give a reasonable coverage of the issues treated and the 
conclusions reached.
The Age’s main point made by Mark Forbes, its foreign affairs correspon- 
dent, was that ‘the case made by the Howard Government for war against 
Iraq was not fully supported by advice from its own intelligence agencies’. 
The headlines were critical of the Prime Minister—‘Doubt cast on Howard’s 
reasons for Iraq war’ and ‘Tough questions remain unanswered despite PM’s 
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claims of exoneration’.  One article focused on ONA’s changing advice: ‘The 
key intelligence agency that advises Prime Minister John Howard suddenly 
and inexplicably hardened its view that Iraq had WMD six months before war 
began.’  This theme was repeated and ONA compared with DIO.  ‘Unlike the 
DIO, which continued to state that there was no evidence that Iraq had resumed 
biological or chemical weapons production, ONA extrapolated from untested 
intelligence, the Committee said.’  The Age’s international editor commented 
that ‘the Jull Committee has highlighted gaps and exaggerations in the case put 
to the public’ and that it ‘found the Howard government was more measured 
and cautious in tone than its counterparts in Britain and the US.’  The Age did 
not discuss the relationship between the intelligence agencies’ forecasts and 
the consequences of invasion.
The Australian’s page 1 headline was ‘PM’s spin sexed-up Iraq threat’ 
and the main point, as seen by Patrick Walters, was that the Howard govern-
ment had exaggerated the threat of WMD because it based its case on flawed 
US and British intelligence assessments ‘rather than the more cautious, yet 
still overstated, analysis presented by Australia’s key intelligence agencies.’ 
Cameron Stewart focused on ONA’s changed emphasis in September 2002, 
saying that Jull made damning reading for those inside ONA.  However, he 
also said that Jull ‘reaches the equally damning conclusion that the Howard 
government’s rhetoric on Iraq exceeded the evidence provided to it by its own 
two intelligence agencies’.
Remarkably, The Australian’s editorial nevertheless said that the Jull 
Report had ‘found the Prime Minister and his colleagues did not pervert the 
advice of their intelligence advisers’. It did acknowledge that ‘the govern-
ment’s case for war was stronger than the language used by the intelligence 
agencies,’ but offered the curious explanation that ‘the decision to fight had 
to be expressed in political terms, not the careful language of bureaucrats’. 
Three of The Australian’s writers looked at the relationship between 
intelligence and the decision to go to war. Patrick Walters wrote: 
The Prime Minister did not go to war because of the intelligence  
presented on the threat posed by Saddam. In the end it was not WMD 
but the pull of the US alliance that proved irresistible to Howard in 
determining that we join the US-led coalition in invading Iraq.  But, 
as this report makes abundantly clear, Australians were entitled to  
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conclude from the case presented by the Howard Government that the 
WMD threat posed by Iraq was immediate and pressing.  
Paul Kelly emphasised that ‘the war was not, repeat not, driven by 
intelligence’.  Matt Price observed that the Prime Minister ‘betrays not a jot 
of doubt the war was justified, albeit that his reasons for signing on flipped 
and flopped like laundry in a cyclone’.
The Australian Financial Review’s Laura Tingle reported that the Jull 
Report said ‘government ministers’ public statements were “more strongly 
worded than most of the Australian intelligence community’s judgments” 
and were incomplete in documenting intelligence unfavourable to the case 
for war’.  She quoted the Jull conclusion about the government’s statements 
not matching the evidence from its own intelligence agencies and quoted 
Kim Beazley (the leader of the Labor Opposition) in Parliament saying ‛the 
exaggerations, the sense of immediacy, was the work of politicians outside 
the intelligence advice they were being presented.’
She also pointed out that Howard and Downer used the finding of no 
evidence of political pressure to claim that the report, ‘despite its damning 
findings, vindicated the government’s use of intelligence in the lead-up to the 
war’.  The Australian Financial Review’s editorial focused on ONA’s change 
of tone in September 2002.
The headlines in The Canberra Times were ‘PM talked up war’ and ‘Case 
not backed by our spy bureaus’.  Ross Peake commented that ‘the gap between 
his presentation and the assessments is the core finding’.
The editorial in The Canberra Times was almost the only article to look 
at the issue of effective planning for a post-war Iraq. It said the benefits of 
supporting the US had to be weighed against other considerations ‘of how 
Australia’s actions might affect Australia’s own interests generally or in our 
neighbourhood’ and ‘whether the US strategy was likely to be effective’.  It 
concluded that ‘John Howard seemed to address neither’.
The editorial also considered the reasons for going to war.  It said that 
the report made clear that ‘Australia did not enter the war against Iraq on the 
basis of a brief that Saddam Hussein’s possession of [WMD] constituted a 
clear and present threat to Australia’s interests... It was always apparent to 
most observers that Australia’s decision to get involved owed most to a desire 
to stand alongside the United States’.
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Finally, the editorial advised the public to be sceptical the next time the 
government cited vague intelligence advice about things like terrorism, noting 
that it was almost incredible to assume that the government would honestly 
share with the public the advice it had received.
The Sydney Morning Herald’s Tom Allard began with ‘the Federal 
Government selectively used alarming overseas intelligence to bolster its case 
for war against Iraq, but did not doctor—or “sex up” reports on the threat’. 
He continued, ‘government claims that Iraq posed a grave and immediate 
threat were not backed by Australian intelligence assessments’ and repeated 
‘government statements were worded more strongly than Australian intelli-
gence judgments because they were based on British and US assessments’.
Other articles, by Peter Hartcher and Tom Allard, covered the 
absence of imminent threat, the conflict between Howard’s and the UK Joint 
Intelligence Committee’s assessments about the reduction of the terrorist threat, 
the ‘substantial hardening’ of the ONA assessment in September 2002, and 
the US alliance being the main reason for going to war.  An editorial focused 
on the need for independence and impartiality of ONA.  Tom Allard returned 
to this issue on March 6.
Specialist commentator and former senior Defence bureaucrat Hugh 
White noted that analysis of policy advice was beyond the committee’s terms 
of reference but claimed that the policy departments had been mute on how 
to deal with whatever the threat was and what the costs and consequences of 
the invasion would be:  ‘The government had already made up its mind, and 
their opinion was not called for or offered.’  He asked delicately, ‘is that how 
we want the system to operate?’
The accuracy and honesty of the government’s explanations
The Australian government has blamed poor intelligence for the decision to 
go to war.  The government did not say that US and UK assessments differed 
from Australian judgments or that there were differences between ONA and 
DIO. It did not say that DIO’s judgments on the significance of the threat 
were pretty much right.
Despite all that, and despite the critical headlines in all the papers, the 
outcome of the Jull Report and the commentary on it was summed up in 
the headline to one of Paul Kelly’s articles: ‘Caught by facts, but PM wins 
the politics’ (The Australian, 3 March 2004).  Why was this?  At least six 
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well-known techniques of media management (or manipulation, depending 
on your point of view) limited the damage to the government. 
Selectivity 
The government naturally chose to focus on the points that served their 
purposes and ignored the others.  Is this reasonable?  Greg Sheridan had 
thought so.  ‘The most you can say is that Blair (and Howard and Bush) 
presented information they thought to be true in a fashion designed to be 
supportive of their general argument for war.  There’s nothing wrong with 
that’ (The Australian, 31 January 2004).  
Denial of fact
Almost universally, the media identified a major criticism in terms like ‘the 
Jull Committee has highlighted gaps and exaggerations in the case put to 
the public’ (The Age, 3 March 2004).  The Prime Minister simply replied: ‘I 
certainly didn’t exaggerate things’ (quoted in The Age, The Australian and 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 March 2004). 
Deception
Howard had claimed that ONA had vetted his speeches.8 In fact, ONA had 
only confirmed ‘the accuracy of the references to intelligence information’ 
(Jull, 2003, pp. 93-94),  which apparently meant that ONA confirmed the 
accuracy of the American and British quotes that Howard used, not that the 
assessments themselves were actually correct.  Mark Forbes wrote, ‘astound-
ingly, given the Prime Minister has repeatedly stated that the ONA endorsed 
the contents of his Iraq speeches, the report reveals it did not examine the 
accuracy of claims coming from overseas agencies’.  Tom Allard wrote that 
‘ONA checked the use of foreign material to ensure it was quoted accurately, 
but did not scrutinise the content of the claims to ensure they were true.’
Fabrication
The Canberra Times quoted the Prime Minister saying that the report 
‘completely denied the 12-month claim of Labor that we went to war based 
on a lie’ but went no further.  Matt Price in The Australian and Alan Ramsey 
in the Sydney Morning Herald both pointed out that it did no such thing.   
Deliberate misquoting
Howard said: ‛The committee found that the statements that I and my 
colleagues had made were very moderate, particularly compared with 
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statements made elsewhere’ (Hansard, 1 March 2004, p. 25391).  This is not 
the same thing as reported by Tony Parkinson, The Age’s international editor: 
‛The Jull Committee…found the Howard Government was more measured 
and cautious in tone than its counterparts in Britain and the US’.9  It is of 
course possible to be more moderate than others while still exaggerating the 
threat.
Bland deflection
When asked about the unexplained hardening of ONA’s assessments, 
Downer said he had not noticed any significant difference in the reporting 
(The Age, 3 March 2004).  
Conclusion and the public’s right to know
Some people think foreign affairs and security matters are too arcane and 
complicated to be treated adequately in the media.  Even allowing for 
limitations of time and space and other restrictions on comprehensive and 
objective reporting, the coverage of the Jull Report was good.
However, it is in the nature of things that media attention is very hard to 
sustain.  Not many seemed to remember that a year before the Jull Report’s 
release an ONA officer, Andrew Wilkie, resigned over the government’s 
presentation of the intelligence and the policy, saying that Iraq did not pose 
a threat to anybody.  He had said that the Iraqi military was very small, their 
WMD programme was fragmented and contained, and there was no hard 
evidence of active co-operation between Iraq and Al Qaeda.  Because he had 
the courage to say so in public he was subjected to a disgraceful campaign of 
denigration, even though he was right. 
In March 2004, the excitement did not last long.  Howard’s quick 
agreement to Jull’s recommendation to have a broader inquiry into intelligence 
matters took the political heat out of the other findings.
There was no great sense of indignation, let alone outrage about 
misleading or unfactual statements by the Prime Minister or Downer, perhaps 
demonstrating that the media and the public accept after long experience that 
this is how politicians behave and the electorate does not really care very 
much.  On the other hand, WMD joined the litany of examples of the Howard 
Government’s deceptions, which perhaps had a cumulative effect by the time 
of the election in 2007.
It is most unusual for any government to allow intelligence matters to 
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be aired in public.  The Jull Report is a significant exception and prompts 
the question: why cannot more intelligence assessments be made publicly 
available? (After deletion of information that would compromise sources and 
methods, of course).  The contents of the intelligence judgments revealed by 
the Jull Committee were in themselves no different from those held publicly 
by others.  In this, as in many other instances, the government did not wish 
to display the fact that their decisions did not reflect the views of their expert 
advisers.
Writing in November 2007, there seems to be no military solution in Iraq. 
If it is so important, should Australia be committing more money and troops? 
If our troops should withdraw when there is a reasonable chance that Iraq can 
look after itself, when will that be?  Howard has not told us what he thought 
about this.  I wonder if the Australian Intelligence Community has offered an 
opinion (or more than one), and if Rudd will tell us what it is.  More broadly, 
what institutional changes will Rudd pursue to enable the people to be better 
informed about significant policy options?  A genuine commitment to more 
open government backed by specific improvements, such as a reduction of 
the constraints in the Freedom of Information legislation, would be a good 
start.
Notes
1. WMD usually refers to Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) and nuclear 
weapons.
2. The final report of the Iraq Survey Group can be seen at  http://www.globalsecurity.
org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/
3. ASIO is the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, ASIS is the Australian 
Secret Intelligence Service, and DSD is the Defence Signals Directorate. The 
Committee was chaired by David Jull, a member of the Liberal Party, and included 
former Labor Defence Ministers Kim Beazley and Robert Ray.
4. The Office of National Assessments (ONA) analyses information from all sources 
on the external influences on Australia's interests.  It reports to the Prime Minister.
5. Prime Minister's Address to the Nation, 20 March 2003.  See http://pandora.nla.
gov.au/pan/10052/20030521-0000/www.pm.gov.au/iraq/index.html
6. Prime Minister's Address to the National Press Club, 14 March 2003.  See http://
pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/10052/20030521-0000/www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/
7. See, for example, his speeches in the Parliament on 4 February and 18 March 
2003 (pp. 10650 and 12508) and to the National Press Club on 14 March 2003.
8. See, for example, Hansard, 1 March 2004, p. 25397.
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9. On the ABC's 7.30 Report that night, Howard dropped the qualification altogether, 
saying that the Committee ‘found that the statements I and my colleagues have made 
were very moderate.’  Sadly, Michael Brissenden responded: ‘True enough.’
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